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Abstract
First we show that for wealth-constrained agents who may commit an act
twice the optimal sanctions are the offender’s entire wealth for the first and
zero for the second crime. Then we ask the question whether this decreasing
sanction scheme is subgame perfect (time consistent), i.e., does a rent-seeking
government stick to this sanction scheme after the first crime has occurred.
If the benefit and/or the harm from the crime are not too large, this is indeed
the case; otherwise, equal sanctions for both crimes are optimal.
Keywords: crime and punishment, repeat offenders, subgame perfection.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D82, K41, K42.
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1. Introduction
The literature on optimal law enforcement typically assumes that the govern-
ment can commit to sanction schemes.1 This means the government can use
any set of threats to penalize wrongdoers. In particular, if a crime occurs,
the government actually sanctions the wrongdoers even though, ex post, it
may have no incentive to do so. Potential wrongdoers believe that the gov-
ernment will carry out the threat at any cost and, therefore, do not engage
in the act in the first place.
In this paper we give up the assumption that the government can commit
to whatever sanction scheme. We consider the analysis of optimal sanctions
without the possibility to commit important because judges often have a lot
of discretion as to the size of the penalty: they may, for example, adjust
sanctions to the financial possibilities, the age, the education, etc. of the
wrongdoer. Accordingly, we allow only for sanctions that the government
actually wishes to implement should a crime have occurred.
Ruling out full commitment changes the optimal enforcement schemes.
Suppose, for example, the government does not care about the sanction as
is typically assumed in the literature. Then it will not enforce the penalty
if a crime has happened given that there is, say, a small cost of doing so.
The rational criminal will anticipate the ex post enforcement behavior of
the government. Therefore, she will commit the crime because the threat of
being sanctioned is not credible. Once we drop the commitment assumption,
the typical deterrence equilibria of the law enforcement literature between
potential wrongdoers and the government are based on empty threats. In
the language of game theory, the equilibria are not subgame perfect or time
consistent.
We study the problem of subgame perfect sanctions using the framework
of Emons (2003). Agents may commit a crime twice. The act is inefficient;
the agents are thus to be deterred. The agents are wealth constrained so
that increasing the fine for the first offense means a reduction in the possible
sanction for the second offense and vice versa. The agents may follow history
dependent strategies, i.e., commit the crime a second time if and only if
they were (were not) apprehended the first time. The government seeks to
minimize the probability of apprehension.
Ignoring the government’s commitment problem, it is optimal to set the
sanction for the first offense equal to the entire wealth of the agents while
1See, e.g., Garoupa (1997) or Polinsky and Shavell (2000) for surveys.
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the sanction for the second offense equals zero. The intuition is as follows: A
money penalty imposed for the second offense reduces the amount a person
can pay for the first offense, since the wealth available to pay penalties is
assumed to be fixed over the two periods. For that reason, a higher proba-
bility event – namely, a first offense that is detected – will be more effective
use of the scarce money penalty resource than a lower probability event –
namely, a second detected offense. Why is the probability of detection lower
for the second rather than for the first crime? Simply, because an agent
faces the possibility of being sanctioned for the second crime if and only if
she has already been sanctioned for the first time. For our further results it
is important to note that the optimal probability of apprehension increases
with the benefit from the crimes.
This decreasing sanction scheme raises of course the issue of time consis-
tency. Will the government really charge the agent the entire wealth when
she was apprehended for the first crime, knowing that then she will commit
the second act for sure? Isn’t it better for the government to renege and
charge little for the first act so that the agent still has sufficient wealth to
pay a sanction that deters the second crime? Given that the first act has
been committed anyway, that way the government can at least deter the
second act.
To study this problem we consider a rent-seeking government. The sanc-
tions paid by the criminals enter the government’s welfare function. Our
government, therefore, has an ex post incentive to collect fines. The govern-
ment can commit to a probability of apprehension but not to sanctions. Our
basic result is that if the agent’s benefit and/or the harm from the crime are
not too large, then the scheme where the sanction for the first crime is the
entire wealth and the sanction for the second crime is zero is indeed subgame
perfect.
To see this, consider the government after the agent has been appre-
hended for the first crime. If it implements our decreasing sanction scheme,
it appropriates the entire wealth yet incurs the harm of the second crime.
Thus, the lower the harm of the second crime, the more attractive is this
option.
The alternative is to set the sanction for the second crime to a level that
deters the act. With this option the government doesn’t incur the harm of
the second crime, yet forgoes the sanction for the second crime because it is
deterred. If the benefit from the crime goes up, the optimal probability of
apprehension increases, yet by more than the benefit; therefore, the actual
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sanction necessary to deter the second crime falls. Since a low sanction for
the second crime means a high amount the government can charge for the
first crime, a high benefit of the second crime makes this option attractive.
Accordingly, only for low benefits the government sticks to the decreasing
sanction scheme.
If the benefit and/or the harm of the second crime are large, our decreas-
ing sanction scheme is no longer time consistent. The government prefers
to deter the second crime should the first crime have occurred. Accordingly,
only sanction schemes where each sanction by itself deters the corresponding
crime are time consistent. In this case the optimal subgame perfect sanction
scheme entails equal sanctions in both periods. Enforcement costs are higher
than with the decreasing sanction scheme.
The only paper we are aware of that deals with the problem of time con-
sistent sanctions is Boadway and Keen (1998). They consider a government
choosing a capital income tax rate and an enforcement policy. The govern-
ment can commit to the enforcement policy but not to the tax rate. Ex
ante the government wishes to announce a low tax rate to induce savings; ex
post, when savings have been made, it will renege and apply a high tax rate.
Boadway and Keen show that by committing to a lax enforcement policy the
government can alleviate the welfare loss implied by its inability to commit
to the tax rate.
In the next section we describe the model. In section 3 we derive the
optimal sanctions for a government that can commit and in section 4 for a
government that cannot commit. Section 5 concludes.
2. The Model
Consider a set of potential wrongdoers which has measure 1. Individuals live
for two periods. In each period the agents can engage in an illegal activity,
such as false parking, illegally raising prices, polluting the environment, or
evading taxes. If an agent commits the act in either period, she receives a
monetary benefit b > 0. We consider crimes without social gains. Using the
language of Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1991), b is the illicit gain and the crime
creates no acceptable gain.2 The act causes a monetary harm h to society
2See also Chu, Hu, and Huang (2000) for an analysis of crimes without social gains.
They argue that the gains to the offender are not considered because the crime is not
socially acceptable or because the gains of offenders (such as theft or other zero-sum
crimes) offset with the victims’ losses.
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which is borne by the government. Since h > 0, the act is not socially
desirable. The individuals are thus to be deterred from the activity.
To achieve deterrence the government chooses sanctions and a probability
of apprehension. The government cannot tell whether an agent is in the
first or second period of her life. The government only observes whether
the crime is the first or the second one. Accordingly, the government uses
fines s1, s2 ≥ 0 where s1 applies to first-time and s2 to second-time observed
offenders.
We assume that the government cannot commit to sanctions. This means
that the government can choose a different sanction from the one announced
at the outset once a crime occurred. Typically, a judge always finds good
reasons to reduce or increase sanctions. In addition to sanctions, the govern-
ment chooses a probability of apprehension p. This probability is the same
for first- and second-time offenses.3 It is irrevocably fixed before the agents
take their actions. The government cannot easily change the amounts spent
on, say, training the police. Accordingly, we assume that the government can
commit to p while it cannot commit to sanctions.4
In the law enforcement literature the optimal policy is derived by max-
imizing the sum of the offenders’ benefits minus the harm caused by the
offenses minus law enforcement expenditures. Sanctions do not enter the
benevolent government’s objective function because they are a mere trans-
fer of money.5 Within this framework the literature derives the results on
optimal fines and optimal probabilities of apprehension. See, e.g., Garoupa
(1997) or Polinsky and Shavell (2000).
Nevertheless, these results hold true if and only if the government can fully
commit to the probability of apprehension and to the announced sanction.
To see this, suppose the government incurs a small cost ε > 0 of collecting
the fine. Suppose the agent has been apprehended for the crime and then
the government strategically decides whether or not to impose the sanction.
With such a sequencing, the rational government will not impose the fine: it
3We thus rule out the case where agents with a criminal record are more closely moni-
tored than agents without a record. See Landsberger and Meilijson (1982) for an analysis
of optimal detection probabilities.
4Boadway and Keen (1998) use the same commitment structure when studying the
time consistency problem in the taxation of capital income.
5In the explicit formulation welfare is the criminal’s utility (benefit minus expected
sanction) plus the government’s utility (expected sanction minus harm) minus enforcement
costs.
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does not care about the fine anyway and it can safe the cost ε. Anticipating
this ex post behavior of the government, the threat of being sanctioned is
not credible and the agent will commit the act in the first place. To put it
in the language of game theory: the equilibrium in the game between the
offender and the government is not subgame perfect.
If we want to take the issue of subgame perfection (or time consistency)
seriously, we must give the government an incentive to actually collect the
fines. We do so by including the sanctions in the government’s payoffs.6
Our government maximizes revenues from sanctions minus the harms minus
the enforcement expenditure and has thus an incentive to collect the fine
should a crime have occurred. To save on notation we take the probability
of apprehension p as an indicator of the enforcement expenditure.
This approach can be motivated in several ways. Garoupa and Klerman
(2002) take the public choice perspective of a self-interested, rent-seeking
government which maximizes revenues minus the harm borne by the govern-
ment minus expenditure on law enforcement.7 Polinsky and Shavell (2000)
consider the standard benevolent welfare function and add a term reflecting
individuals’ fairness-related utility. If this fairness-related utility equals the
actual sanction, their government maximizes the same welfare function as
ours.8
Individuals are risk neutral and maximize expected income. They have
initial wealth W > 0. Think of W as the value of the privately owned house
or assets with a long maturity. The agents hold on to their wealth over
both periods unless the government interferes with sanctions. Any additional
income they receive in both periods, be it through legal or illegal activities, is
consumed immediately. Accordingly, all the government can confiscate is W .
If the fine exceeds the agent’s wealth, she goes bankrupt and the government
seizes the remaining assets. This implies that the fines s1 and s2 have to
satisfy the “budget constraint” s1 + s2 = W .
9
6In terms of the explicit welfare function given in the preceding footnote, we simply
exclude the criminal’s utility (benefit minus expected sanction).
7Dittmann (2001) uses a similar approach.
8In Rubinstein (1979) the government’s payoffs also depend on whether or not it pun-
ishes the offender. Unlike the other papers, Rubinstein’s government is worse off if it
punishes the offender, independently of whether the act was committed intentionally or
not.
9This assumption distinguishes our approach from Polinsky and Shavell (1998) who
work with a maximum per period sanction sm. Accordingly, they may set s1 = s2 = sm,
which is typically the optimal enforcement scheme. In their framework sm is like a per
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To save on notation let the interest rate be zero. An agent can choose
between the following strategies:
• She can choose not to commit the act at all. We call this strategy (0,0)
which gives rise to utility U(0, 0) = W . This is the strategy we wish to
implement.
• She can choose to commit the act in period 1 and not in period 2.
Call this strategy (1,0); here we have U(1, 0) = W + b − ps1. The act
generates benefit b; with probability p the agent is apprehended and
pays the sanction s1.
• The agent can opt to commit the crime in period 2 but not in period
1. Call this strategy (0,1) generating utility U(0, 1) = W + b − ps1.
With strategy (0,1) the agent has the same utility as with strategy (1,0)
because the government observes only one offense.
• Moreover, the agent can commit the act in both periods which we
denote by (1, 1) and U(1, 1) = W + b − ps1 + b − p((1 − p)s1 + ps2)).
The second crime is detected with probability p. With probability p the
agent has a criminal record in the second period and thus is fined s2;
with probability (1− p) she has no record and pays s1 if apprehended.
• Finally, the agent can choose two history dependent strategies.10 First,
she commits the act in period 1. If she is not apprehended, she also
commits the act in period 2; however, if she is apprehended in period
1, she does not commit the act in period 2. Call this strategy (1,(1|no
record;0|otherwise)) with U(1, (1|no record; 0|otherwise)) = W + b −
ps1 + (1 − p)(b − ps1). Since the agent stops her criminal activities if
she is apprehended once, she is never sanctioned with s2.
• Second, she commits the act in period 1. If she is not apprehended, she
does not commit the act in period 2; however, if she is apprehended in
period 1, she commits the act in period 2. Call this strategy (1,(0|no
record;1|otherwise)) with U(1, (0|no record; 1|otherwise)) = W + b −
period income which cannot be transferred into the next period. Burnovski and Safra
(1994) use the same budget constraint as we do.
10These history dependent strategies distinguish our paper from Burnovski and Safra
(1994) where individuals decide ex ante simply on the number of crimes.
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ps1 + p(b − ps2). It turns out that this strategy defines the agents’
binding incentive constraint for the optimal sanctions.
Before we start deriving optimal sanctions, we have to ensure that the
government indeed wants complete deterrence. We achieve this by assuming
W − 2h < −1. If the government completely deters, there is neither harm
nor revenue and the maximum possible expenditure for deterrence is 1 (recall
that we take the probability of apprehension as a measure for enforcement
cost). If the government doesn’t deter at all, enforcement costs are zero, the
government incurs the harm twice, and the maximal revenue it can obtain
is the agents’ wealth W . Accordingly, if the harm is sufficiently large, the
rent-seeking government wants complete deterrence.
Let us now analyze sanctions that give the agents proper incentives not
to engage in the activity in either period. We first derive the cost-minimizing
sanction scheme that achieves perfect deterrence ignoring the government’s
commitment problem. The analysis follows Emons (2003). We will consider
the government’s incentives to implement this penalty scheme in section 4.
3. Optimal Sanctions if the Government can commit
We assume that agents have enough wealth so that deterrence is always pos-
sible, i.e., 2b < W . The agent does not follow strategy (1,0), if U(1, 0) ≤
U(0, 0), she does not follow strategy (0,1), if U(0, 1) ≤ U(0, 0), etc. Straight-
forward computations confirm that the agent does not engage in strategies
(1,0), (0,1), and (1,(1|no record;0|otherwise)), if
s1 ≥ b/p; (1)
she does not pick strategy (1, 1), if
s2 ≥ (2b/p2)− s1((2/p)− 1); (2)
and she does not pick strategy (1,(0|no record;1|otherwise)), if
s2 ≥ (b(1 + p)/p2)− s1/p. (3)
insert Figures 1 and 2 around here
Accordingly, with all sanction schemes (s1, s2) to the right of the bold line
in Figures 1 and 2, the agent has proper incentives and commits no crime.
For example, the scheme s1 = s2 = b/p induces no crimes.
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Let us next minimize the enforcement costs, as given by p, while providing
incentives not to commit any crime.11 We will minimize p taking the incentive
constraint (3) into account. Then we show that the optimal pˆ also satisfies
the incentive constraints (1) and (2).
Obviously, Becker’s (1968) maximum fine result applies here, meaning
that in order to minimize p the government will use the agent’s entire wealth
for sanctions.12 Accordingly, plugging the budget constraint s1 + s2 = W
into (3) and differentiating the equality yields
dp/ds1 = (p− p2)/(b− s1 − 2p(W − s1)) < 0
for b < s1 ≤ W . Consequently,
sˆ1 = W, sˆ2 = 0, and pˆ = b/(W − b).
Since b/p < 2b/p(1 − p) < b(1 + p)/p ∀p ∈ (0, 1), the incentive constraints
(1) and (2) are also satisfied.
We thus find that the optimal sanction scheme sets sˆ1 = W and sˆ2 = 0.
First time offenders are punished with the maximal possible sanction while
second time offenders are not punished at all. The sanction s1 is high enough
that it not only deters first-time offenses but also second-time offenses even
though they come for free.
The intuition for this result follows immediately from the incentive con-
straint (3). The agent pays the sanction s1 with probability p and the sanc-
tion s2 only with probability p
2. To put it differently: The agent is charged
s2 with probability p if and only if she has paid already s1. Since paying the
fine s1 is more likely than paying s2, shifting resources from s2 to s1 increases
deterrence for given p. Consequently, p is minimized by putting all the scarce
resources into s1.
It is perhaps somewhat surprising that the strategy (1,(0|no record;1|other-
wise)) and not the strategy (1,(1|no record;0|otherwise)) defines the binding
incentive constraint in the optimal penalty structure. Given that the opti-
mal penalties are declining, an agent who was not apprehended for the first
crime has a strong incentive not to commit the act a second time: if she is
apprehended she pays the high sanction s1. If the agent was, however, ap-
prehended for the first crime, the second crime comes for free. The sanction
11Since in our setup the harm of the crime exceeds its acceptable benefit, maximizing
social welfare boils down to minimizing enforcement costs.
12If s1+s2 < W , sanctions can be raised and p lowered so as to keep deterrence constant.
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s1 has to be high enough so that she doesn’t commit the first crime in the
first place.
4. Optimal Sanctions if the Government cannot commit
Let us now check under which conditions the sanction scheme sˆ1 = W , sˆ2 = 0
together with the minimal enforcement probability pˆ = b/(W−b) is subgame
perfect. This means: Does the government really implement these sanctions
once the agent has committed a crime? To do so, consider the subgame
starting when the agent has been apprehended for the first crime.
If the government sticks to the penalty scheme sˆ1 = W , sˆ2 = 0, the
agent will commit the second offense for sure because it comes for free. The
government’s payoff then is W − 2h− pˆ. It incurs the harm twice and seizes
the agent’s entire wealth with s1.
The alternative is to lower s1 and at the same time increase s2 such
that the agent doesn’t commit the second act. Obviously, the rent-seeking
government will set s2 = b/pˆ, the minimal sanction achieving deterrence. The
government goes for the minimal sanction guaranteeing deterrence because,
by its very nature, the government will not get this money; that way, s1 is
as large as possible. Using pˆ = b/(W − b), we find s2 = W − b and s1 = b.
If the government follows this strategy, its payoffs are −h + b− pˆ. It incurs
the harm from the first crime, collects s1 = b and there is no more crime.
Comparing the two payoffs, obviously the government prefers to stick to
sˆ1 = W , sˆ2 = 0 if W − h ≥ b. The government gets the entire wealth less
the harm by sticking to the optimal incentive scheme whereas it gets s1 = b
if it chooses to deter the second offense. We may, therefore, conclude that
s∗1 = W , s
∗
2 = 0 is subgame perfect if the agent’s benefit b and/or the harm
are not too large. See Figure 1.
Let us now determine the optimal subgame perfect sanction scheme to-
gether with the probability of detection p if W − h < b. Consider again
the government deciding on sanctions after the wrongdoer has been appre-
hended for the first act. If the government wants to deter the second act,
it will set s2 = b/p. It chooses the minimal sanction ensuring deterrence
because it will not get the money. This way it can collect the maximum
amount s1 = W − b/p for the first act from the agent.
In contrast, the government may wish to induce the second crime. It does
so by setting s2 < b/p. The government collects s2 only with probability p; it
collects s1 for sure because we are in the node where the government has just
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apprehended the agent for the first crime. Since W = s1 + s2, the revenue
maximizing government sets s1 = W and s2 = 0 if it wants to induce the
second crime. This generates a payoff of W − 2h− p for the government.
The government prefers the strategy of inducing the second crime to
optimally deterring the second crime if W − 2h − p ≥ W − h − b/p − p ⇔
b/p > h. Deterring the second crime has the cost of the foregone revenue
s2 = b/p; encouraging the second crime has the cost of the harm h.
The left-hand side of the inequality b/p > h is decreasing in p. Therefore,
if it is not satisfied for the minimal probability of apprehension inducing no
crimes pˆ = b/(W−b), it does not hold for any p deterring both crimes. Thus,
if b/pˆ < h ⇔ W − h < b, the government prefers to deter the second crime
and does so optimally by setting s∗1 = s
∗
2 = W/2 and p
∗ = 2b/W . See Figure
2.
A low probability of apprehension increases b/p, the sanction which is
necessary to deter the second crime. Deterring a second crime thus becomes
unattractive. By choosing a low p, the government commits not to raise s2
to a level which deters. This result is similar to Boadway and Keen (1998)
where the government commits to a lax enforcement in order not to raise tax
rates after savings decisions have been made.
We summarize the preceding observations with the following proposition.
Proposition: If W − h ≥ b, the optimal subgame perfect sanction scheme
is given by s∗1 = W , s
∗
2 = 0 and p
∗ = b/(W − b).
If W − h < b, the optimal subgame perfect sanction scheme is given by
s∗1 = s
∗
2 = W/2 and p
∗ = 2b/W .
Obviously, the government is better off in the first case where it uses
the decreasing sanction scheme. In both cases crime is completely deterred.
With the decreasing sanction scheme the probability of apprehension and
hence enforcement cost is lower than in the second case of constant sanctions.
5. Conclusions
The purpose of this paper is to analyze subgame perfect sanction schemes,
i.e., sanctions which the government indeed wants to implement should a
crime have occurred. We consider the problem of time consistency important
because judges tend to have a lot of discretion as to the size of the penalty.
They anticipate that a high penalty now may reduce the potential for future
10
sanctions. Rational criminals will anticipate this and thus not be deterred
by empty threats.
A rent-seeking government will stick to the optimal decreasing sanction
scheme if it gets more money by allowing the second crime and cashing in
the agent’s entire wealth with the first sanction than by deterring the second
crime. In the opposite case the government prefers to deter the second crime.
It does so with equal sanctions for both crimes.
Accordingly, the constraint of time consistency has bite. If the govern-
ment can commit, decreasing sanctions are always optimal; if the government
cannot commit, decreasing sanctions may still be optimal but so may be equal
sanctions. We haven’t explained escalating sanctions based on offense his-
tory which are embedded in many penal codes and sentencing guidelines.
Explaining escalating sanctions seems to be fairly difficult for the law en-
forcement literature.13 Nevertheless, in our set-up the commitment issue
ruled out decreasing sanction schemes in some cases. Perhaps the problem
of time consistency is a fruitful track for future research to explain escalating
sanction schemes.
13See Emons (2003) for a discussion of the problems the law enforcement has in explain-
ing escalating sanctions.
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